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How Much is Too Much?
Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal Use
vs. Intent to Distribute
INTRODUCTION
Defendant X is on trial for the possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute. X was not observed selling drugs, but he was
found with the drugs at the time of his arrest. Because the jury will be
required to decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
available circumstantial evidence,' an integral part of the government's
case will be the introduction of testimony from a non-arresting law
enforcement officer as an expert witness in narcotics distribution. The
limited prohibition of ultimate issue testimony as set out in Federal Rule
of Evidence 704(b),2 however, poses a problem for both the prosecutor
and the expert by restricting the testimony regarding the issue of intent
without specifying what testimony remains permissible.
Part of the confusion surrounding the application of Rule 704(b) to
drug-related cases stems from its legislative history. It is not altogether
clear that Rule 704(b) was meant to apply to opinion testimony beyond
that of mental health experts.3 Despite this ambiguity, the courts have
construed the plain language of the Rule as applying to all expert opin-
ion testimony regarding the intent of the defendant. Thus, Rule 704(b)
has impacted the prosecution of drug-related crimes where the govern-
ment maintains the burden of proving that the defendant knowingly or
I. See United States v. Echeveri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1993).
2. FED. R. EVID. 704 states:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of fact alone.
3. See S. REP. No. 225, at 230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13.
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intentionally possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute.4
In grappling with the perhaps unintended application of Rule
704(b) outside of the psychiatric realm, the courts have progressively
become more restrictive as to what form expert testimony may take.
The one absolute that remains is that the expert may not opine as to the
defendant's intent at the time the offense was committed. A prosecutor
can no longer use strategies such as setting up a hypothetical scenario
that mirrors the facts of the case in order to question the expert, or utiliz-
ing an arresting officer as the narcotics expert. Both of these tactics
have been deemed misleading or confusing to the jury. Finally, the
seemingly permissible device of eliciting testimony that possession of
certain amounts of a controlled dangerous substance is "consistent" with
the intent to distribute, or that certain quantities of drugs are "possessed
for the purpose of distribution" without reference to the defendant's
intent,5 appears to be increasingly disfavored by the courts. The linguis-
tic divergence seems more semantic than psychological and, as one
court noted, the distinction is useless.6
This Comment examines what may be properly asked and
answered within the parameters of the exception carved out of the ulti-
mate issue rule as established by Rule 704(b), and concludes that the ban
on the ultimate question of intent extends to discussions of the purposes
for which the drugs are possessed or behavior consistent with possession
of drugs. Therefore, prosecutors must stop short of asking the question
to which all of the expert's testimony leads. While this seemingly
incomplete method of presenting evidence may not be the most desirable
or the most effective way to deal with the problem created by Rule
704(b), it is the best manner to avoid a potential defense appeal on what
is essentially a technical problem.7
HISTORY
Expert Opinion Testimony Prior to the Federal Rules Of Evidence
The rationale employed for introducing expert witness opinion tes-
4. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1996).
5. See United States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remarking that Rule
704(b) invites the drawing of rather subtle lines where modus operandi evidence and responses to
purely hypothetical questions effectively speak to intent although there was no explicit reference
to the intent of "the defendant").
6. State v. Baskerville, 735 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999).
7. "To what extent an expert can explain legal issues is subject to ill-defined parameters.
Courts have difficulty drawing a line between inadmissible conclusions of law and admissible
assistance to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence." Robert D. Fleming, Hazards of
Expert Witnesses: Disclosing Work Product and Limiting Testimony, 66 DEF. CouNs. J. 538, 545-
46 (1999).
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timony as evidence presented to the trier of fact rests upon the belief that
the average juror is not able to sufficiently adduce certain types of facts
without the benefit of an expert's opinion.8 The basis for this theory is
that highly specific or complicated matters create a need for experts to
explain events and concepts that are "beyond the ken" of the average
person, and, within that context, create a lens through which the jury
may more adroitly view the facts before it.
Historically, however, another school of thought prevailed wherein
expert witnesses were not permitted to testify to ultimate issues in the
case, out of fear that expert opinions would "invade the province of the
jury" and might encourage the jury to adopt, without critical reflection,
whatever the expert might say, thus abandoning their responsibility to
weigh evidence and determine facts.9 Under this view, it was the physi-
cal facts of the investigation that were readily understood by the jury
when they were properly described, and it was for the jury to draw the
proper conclusion. Thus, there was no occasion for the opinion of an
expert witness.' 0 The belief was that, absent inability or incompetence
of jurors on the basis of their day-to-day experience and observation to
comprehend the issues and to evaluate the evidence, the opinions of
experts intruded on the province of the jury to draw inferences and con-
clusions, and thus, were both unnecessary and improper. 1
The controversy between these two competing theories appeared to
have been resolved with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975. A simple, single standard emerged:' 2 "Evidence is admissible,
if and only if, it assists the jury in reaching its determination of fact."' 3
This standard applied to all witness testimony, thus permitting the liberal
use of expert and lay witness testimony to opinions on ultimate fact
issues.
8. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that experts may testify to "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" if such testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue).
9. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 709-
11 (4th ed. 2000). However, commentators regarded the rule against opinions as unduly
restrictive, difficult to apply, and effectively depriving the trier of fact of useful information. 7
WIGMORE §§ 1920 (1921); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
The assumption that a jury, upon hearing an expert answer the very question they must decide,
will simply adopt the expert's conclusion and fail to reach an independent decision based on all
the evidence offered at trial was rejected in the original Rule 704. See Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik
William Delker, A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 711 (2000).
10. People v. Grutz, 105 N.E. 843, 847 (N.Y. 1914).
11. Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. 1976).
12. See FED. R. EvID. 701-706; see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169
(1988) (discussing that the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence is consistent with the
Federal Rule's general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony).
13. Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility Of Expert Witness Testimony: Time To Take The
Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 838 (1988) (citations omitted).
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The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:
The John Hinckley, Jr. Exception
The policy of permissibility in the Federal Rules of Evidence
towards expert testimony was caught in the glare of the media mael-
strom following the acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. for the shooting and
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan, Press Secretary
James Brady, and two others in 1981."4 During the trial, prosecution
and defense expert psychiatrists testified as to Hinckley's mental condi-
tion and offered divergent opinions as to his ability to form the specific
intent to commit homicide. 15 The jury subsequently found Hinckley not
guilty by reason of insanity. 16  The public was outraged and, at the
White House's urging, Congress responded swiftly to the Hinckley ver-
dict with the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act.'7 The Act
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 704, adding subsection (b) to limit
the use of expert opinion testimony. 8
Clearly, the thrust of the legislative intent behind the Act was to
limit psychiatrists to "presenting and explaining their diagnosis," and to
prevent them from being asked to speak in terms of "legal or moral
constructs" that could be construed by a jury as outcome determina-
tive. 19 The Senate Committee Report expressly stated: "the purpose of
14. See United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11 th Cir. 1990).
15. Jonathon B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545
(1985).
16. Lynda C. Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in
Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Declarant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1169 (1986).
17. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). See S. REP. No. 225, at
230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13 ("Under this proposal, expert
psychiatric testimony would be limited to presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such as
whether the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such a
disease or defect, if any, may have been.") The Senate Report includes a quote from the
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense:
Psychiatrists, of course, must be permitted to testify fully about the defendant's
diagnosis, mental state and motivation (in clinical and commonsense terms) at the
time of the alleged act so as to permit the jury or judge to reach the ultimate
conclusion about which they and only they are expert. Determining whether a
criminal defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal fact-finders, not for
experts.)
Id. at 3413; see also Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1061-62 (11th Cir. 1990) (changes made by the
Insanity Defense Reform Act with regard to the use of psychiatric evidence in federal criminal
trials eliminates all affirmative defenses or excuses based on mental disease or defect, changes the
burden of proof to require the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity by clear and
convincing evidence, limits the use of expert psychological testimony on ultimate issues, and
creates a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity); 18 U.S.C. §§ 17(a, b), 4242(b).
18. Note that this legislation was initially adopted by Congress with the Advisory Committee
only being given the right to comment. See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 2057.
19. See FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note; see also Washington v. United States,
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the amendment is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing
expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the
ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact."
2°
The exclusion of ultimate issue testimony under Rule 704(b) is
Congress's acknowledgment that expert testimony may otherwise be
admissible either on the issue of specific intent or on the issue of
insanity. 2' Thus, Rule 704(b) partially revived the ultimate issue rule in
cases requiring a jury to determine whether or not a criminal defendant's
mental state satisfies the applicable legal standard.22 The effect of the
Rule 704(b), is to forbid an expert witness from offering an opinion
stated in legal terms about the defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime.2 3 The expert may not venture an opinion on whether the defen-
dant possessed the required intent at the time of the alleged crime.24
This limitation requires the jury, as the finder of fact, to reach a conclu-
sion as to the defendant's mental state without the benefit of the most
useful testimony the expert could offer-the expert's opinion about the
defendant's mental state at the time the crime was committed. 25 It is far
less clear, however, that Congress intended this limitation to reach the
testimony of non-mental health experts, such as law enforcement
officers.
THE APPLICATION OF 704(B): MENTAL HEALTH EXPERTS AND BEYOND
The circuits have discussed the legislative history of Rule 704(b) as
possibly supporting the argument that the Rule only applies to psychia-
trists and other mental health experts, which is a very restrictive view of
the Rule. Significantly, however, none of the circuits have actually held
that Rule 704(b) has such a limited reach.2 6
The application of the Rule 704(b) limitation to testimony from all
experts, centers on the rationale for precluding ultimate opinion psychi-
390 F.2d 444, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("there is no justification for permitting psychiatrists to testify
on the ultimate issue").
20. S. REP. No. 225, at 230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13.
21. See United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990).
22. Rice & Delker, supra note 9, at 714.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d at 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Reno, 992
F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1993).
25. Rice & Delker, supra note 9, at 711.
26. See United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (excluding expert
testimony that went "beyond merely assisting the jury, explaining the nature" of defendant's
mental disease or describing the "typical effect" of such disease, to stating explicitly whether the
defendant possessed the required mental intent); see also United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031,
1035 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1240-43 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 855
n.6 (10th Cir. 1992).
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atric testimony to exclude any opinions to the ultimate mental state of
the defendant that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be
proven.27 The Senate Report issued on the matter notes that Rule 704 is
designed to reach all such "ultimate" issues, e.g., premeditation in a
homicide case, or lack of predisposition in entrapment.28
A recent case out of the Fourth Circuit contends that Rule 704(b)
was an attempt to constrain psychiatric testimony on behalf of defend-
ants asserting the insanity defense, and that its application to drug dealer
cases is "murky at best."' 29 Even this declaration, however, did not pre-
vent the court from conforming to the widespread practice of all of the
circuits in applying Rule 704(b) to all ultimate issues of intent. The
reality is that the application of Rule 704(b) extends to the testimony of
all expert witnesses, regardless of what Congress may have intended to
do when it passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.30
Rule 704(b) "recognizes the importance of ensuring that the jury
does not place undue weight on expert testimony pertaining, expressly
or impliedly, to the intent of the defendant."'" Particular caution is nec-
essary when law enforcement agents testify as expert witnesses because
there is the potential that juries may unduly grant more weight to the
agent's testimony, conflating his status as both an expert and an
27. United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 704(b) is
not limited to psychiatrists and other mental health experts, but rather, extends to all expert
witnesses, applying to both the insanity defense and to any ultimate mental state of the defendant
that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven).
28. S. REP. No. 225, at 229-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13. The
language suggests an acknowledgment that expert testimony may be admissible on either specific
intent or insanity. See United States v. Skodnek, 896 F. Supp. 60, 64 (D.Mass. 1995).
29. United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 1994).
30. "[Clanons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the
meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal
canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l. Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); see, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241-42 (1989); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (finding that when the
words of a statute are unambiguous, then "judicial inquiry is complete."); see also United States v.
Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The language of Rule 704(b) is perfectly plain. It
does not limit its reach to psychiatrists and other mental health experts. Its reach extends to all
expert witnesses."); United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that "Rule
704(b) prohibits all direct expert testimony concerning a criminal defendant's intent, regardless of
the witness's field of expertise, so long as intent is an element of the crime charged"); United
States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994) (expressing a certain reluctance to read
Rule 704(b) so generously, but feeling constrained by "the fact that this court and others have
routinely assumed that Rule 704(b) imposes an additional limitation, however slight, on the expert
testimony of law enforcement officials"); United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1st
Cir. 1989) (discussing FBI agent's testimony in loan-sharking case).
31. United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States
v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030
(1 th Cir. 1988).
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officer.32
The law enforcement officer is permitted to testify as an expert to
facts that are within his area of "specific knowledge" acquired through
his training and experience.33 "Law enforcement officials can give valu-
able assistance to the trier of fact as expert witnesses; police officers are
often the only credible witnesses in certain fields, such as the habits of
narcotics distributors, who are readily available to testify."34 The expert
opinions and testimony of the officers is merely an analysis of evidence
in light of their specialized knowledge of drug trafficking. 35 For exam-
ple, testimony that the actions of a defendant indicated that he was
guarding a car and that a person transporting $30,000 worth of crack
cocaine and multiple firearms would not allow a complete outsider to
ride in the car, are not impermissible opinions on the ultimate legal
issue, because they are merely explanations of analysis of facts which
would tend to support a jury finding on the ultimate issue.36
When a law enforcement official states an opinion about the crimi-
nal nature of a defendant's activities, it is essential that it is made clear,
"either by the court expressly or in the nature of the examination, that
the opinion is based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal
practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental
processes.'37 For instance, testimony that the expert had never arrested
a courier who was unaware that he or she was carrying drugs and that, in
his opinion, "unwitting couriers" and "blind mules" do not exist is per-
missible, provided it is clear that the agent's extensive experience is the
basis for the agent's testimony about what is "typical."38
THE SPECIAL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ARRESTING OR INVESTIGATORY OFFICER
While it is not improper for the government to elicit expert witness
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers who also testified as
32. See generally Deon J. Nossel, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by
Law Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 231 (1993) (expressing concern
that under certain circumstances expert testimony in drug cases embracing ultimate issues might
be so prejudicial as to require exclusion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
34. Gail Sweeney Stephenson, Note, Police Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule, 44
LA. L. REV. 211, 221 (1983).
35. See Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 815 (10th Cir. 1988) (Seymour, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the admissibility of expert opinion testimony should be based on whether or not the
testimony created "actual prejudice").
36. See United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1996).
37. United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994).
38. See United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2000).
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fact witnesses because they were the arresting or investigating officer,3 9
it is preferable to garner the expert testimony from an officer who is
removed from direct involvement with the facts of the case. This prefer-
ence maintains the fiction that the expert's testimony is that of a neutral
observer who is not commenting on the behavior of any particular indi-
vidual, specifically this defendant, but is simply describing what her
years of experience have lead her to believe to be true of certain
observed behaviors. Otherwise, the jury, as the trier of fact, must dis-
cern between the officer's dual roles, as fact witness and as expert wit-
ness, in determining how much weight to accord to her testimony,
needlessly adding a layer of potential confusion to the process.4n
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: LIMITATIONS OF APPLICATION
While "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact,"'" the abolition of the ultimate issue rule
does not lower the bar so far as to admit all opinion testimony.42 The
evidence must still be "otherwise admissible" under the rules governing
expert testimony. 3 Rule 704(b) forbids a witness from testifying about
a direct opinion on a defendant's guilt or innocence. 44 Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 restricts expert testimony to testimony that assists the jury
in determining a "fact in issue. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evi-
39. United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 760 (2d Cir. 1984). But see, United States v.
Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 121 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he line between the [expert's opinion] and fact
witness testimony is often hard to discern, and that the "facts" testified to are often stated very
broadly and generally. For example, [the expert] testified, without supplying specific dates and
locations, that he participated in undercover purchases of crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and
heroin from [the defendant's gang]"). See also Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Second Circuit
Review-1984-1985 Term: Evidence: Commentary: The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK.
L. REV. 855 (1986).
40. United States v. De Soto, 885 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1989). In DeSoto, Lieutenant
Dailey was called by the government to testify both as an eyewitness and as an expert on law
enforcement and drug dealer methodology. The court stated that "[wihen these two roles are
intertwined, the possibility of juror confusion is increased. This situation placed an especially
heavy burden on the district court to ensure that the jury understood its function in evaluating the
evidence." Id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
42. FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee note.
43. "704(b) is not necessary to limit confusion form expert testimony if Rules 403 and 702
are properly enforced. Rule 704(b) actually makes expert witnesses less useful to fact-finders
because it encourages indirect and incomplete testimony." Anne Lawson Braswell, Note,
Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity
Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 639 (1987).
44. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 388 (9th Cir. 1988). The Rule recognizes that the
jury, upon hearing the testimony regarding the intent of a defendant from an expert, may give the
expert opinion undue weight.
45. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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dence 403 provides for judicial discretion in the exclusion of evidence
on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.4 6 Theoretically,
these provisions provide "ample assurances against the admission of
opinions that would merely tell the jury what result to reach."47
WHAT CONSTITUTES PERMISSIBLE TESTIMONY?
Predicate Fact Testimony
Without general background testimony from experts regarding typi-
cal drug-related behavior, jurors might not understand the significance
of certain facts, such as the amount of the narcotics in question. From
this perspective, this type of testimony provides a factual predicate for
the jury to draw an inference that the defendant possessed the narcotics
for the purpose of retail distribution.48 A sampling of the reasoning uti-
lized by the circuits bear out the universal acceptance of this argument.49
The First Circuit permits a law enforcement officer to testify as a
factual witness as to criminal behavior he has witnessed during his
career in law enforcement.5" Additionally, the circuit allows expert wit-
ness opinion testimony as to "the approximate street value of narcotics
fpund during a search, and that the quantity of narcotics is consistent
with distribution as opposed to personal use, because it affords the jury
appropriate assistance in determining the defendant's intent."'5'
Other circuits have similar approaches. The Second Circuit has
consistently reaffirmed that it permits experts to rely on their field expe-
rience in order to provide general opinion testimony regarding drug-
46. FED. R. EvID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence."
47. See State v. Baskerville, 735 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. 1999); Lampkins v. United States, 401
A.2d 966, 970 (D.C. App. 1979).
48. See supra note 47. Accord United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1993)
(allowing testimony that, based on the expert's experience, the evidence indicated that the amount
of crack seized from Brown "was intended for distribution").
49. None of the circuits have found this type of testimony to be impermissible on its face.
However, the circuits have been inconsistent in enunciating the scope and application of Rule
704(b). See United States v. Woodson, No. 97-4143, 97-4168, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23227 (4th
Cir. Sept. 18, 1998).
50. See United States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1996) (allowing expert testimony
that the amount of cocaine defendant possessed could make more than 140 "jums," officer had
never seen a mere user with more than eight to ten jums at once, and that crack was usually sold in
$10 and $20 amounts in that locale); United States v. Dimarzo, 80 F.3d 656, 659-60 (1st Cir.
1996) (permitting agent to testify that in his twenty-nine years of experience, innocent observers
are not invited to accompany criminals engaged in completing a drug deal).
51. United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210 (1st Cir. 1995), affrd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, Andrade, 94 F.3d at 13.
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related offenses.52 The Fifth Circuit has concluded that an expert can
testify about whether the defendant exhibited certain characteristics or
behaviors that are imbued with special meaning in relation to narcotics
trafficking, as long as the expert leaves the ultimate issue of the defen-
dant's mental state unresolved. 53  The Sixth Circuit noted, in United
States v. Cox, that the practical effect of Rule 704(b) was "not to change
the quantum or quality of expert testimony utilized to convict an
offender, but to change the style of question and answer that can be used
to establish both the offense and the defense thereto. 54
Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert from "expressly stating the final
conclusion or inference as to a defendant's actual mental state" and
mandates that the expert leave the inference, however obvious, for the
jury to draw. In accordance with the plain language of 704(b), all of
the circuits have concluded that an expert witness cannot expressly state
a conclusion as to the defendant's mental state, nor use the proscribed
word "intent. '56 In close cases, however, in which the prosecutor asks
whether the possession was for purposes of distribution or personal use,
the courts tend to "punt" on the actual determination as to whether or not
this crosses the Rule 704(b) threshold and state that even if this language
does constitute error, it is harmless error. 7
A predominate view is that Rule 704(b) is not strictly construed and
prohibits only a direct statement of the defendant's intent.58 This broad
reading permits expert witness opinion testimony to reach a question
such as, "Do you have an opinion as to what a person being in posses-
sion of cocaine would be consistent with or not consistent with?"59 Per-
52. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1994).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 832 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1992).
54. 826 F.2d 1518, 1525 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Prickett, 790 F.2d 35, 37 (6th
Cir. 1986)); United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1986).
55. United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (2d Cir. 1993).
56. All of the circuits have generally read Rule 704(b) as prohibiting all direct expert
testimony concerning a criminal defendant's intent, regardless of the witness's field of expertise,
so long as intent is an element of the crime charged. Dixon, 185 F.3d at 398; United States v.
Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 706 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 185 (D.C. Cir.
1998); United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Morales, 108
F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1995); United
States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d
1463, 1465 (8th Cir. 1990) United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1031 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
57. United States v. Woodson, No. 97-4143, 97-4168, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23227 (4th Cir.
Sept. 18, 1998); cf Valle, 72 F.3d at 216; United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 609-10 (5th Cir.
1994).
58. See United States v. Triplett, 922 F.2d 1174, 1182 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Masat,
896 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1990).
59. See, e.g., Speer, 30 F.3d at 609.
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missible, non-violative answers by the expert may use the term
"consistent" and "inconsistent." For example, in response to the ques-
tion, "Pursuant to your expertise, do you have an opinion regarding what
bringing scales to weigh drugs during a purchase would be consistent
with, personal use?"6 The expert may respond, "From my experience, I
think it would be inconsistent for a user to carry a scale around."'"
The Fourth Circuit appears to draw the line of admissibility at testi-
mony explicitly stating that, in light of the officer's experience, it is his
expert opinion that the defendant intended to distribute the narcotics;
this is the only prohibited inference that must be left to the jury.6 2 The
Fourth Circuit is not alone. The Tenth Circuit concurs that Rule 704(b)
only prevents experts from expressly stating the final conclusion or
inference as to a defendant's actual mental state.63
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that, whereas the expert is permitted
to testify as to surrounding circumstances and his opinion based on his
experience, he may not expressly "state the inference. "64 Rule 704(b),
however, does not prevent the expert witness from testifying as to facts
or opinions from which the jury could conclude or infer that the defen-
dant possessed the requisite mental state.65
In most of the circuits, law enforcement officers are permitted to
rely on their field experience and testify that particular amounts of drugs
are "consistent" with either personal use or distribution, because the
courts reason that the jury is still free to reject the expert's inference.66
This is not true in all circuits. For example, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, expanded the notion of what constitutes a violation
of Rule 704(b) to include the proscription of language such as "consis-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 610.
62. United States v. Kimble, 960 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1992).
63. See United States v. McSwain, 197 F.3d 472, 483 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Schurrer, 156 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th
Cir. 1992).
64. See United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that use of the
word "conspiracy" by the expert witness during cross-examination was a factual conclusion, not a
legal conclusion in the light of Rule 704).
65. United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir.1988) (when the obvious infer-
ence of the expert's testimony was that defendants were aware of contraband aboard the vessel,
testimony is not violative of Rule 704(b) because expert left this final inference for the jury to
draw).
66. United States v. Rivera, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Taylor, 18
F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1994)) (differentiating between the defendant's contention that the govern-
ment's expert witness's testimony that Rivera intended to distribute the heroin and the court's
recognition that expert testified that the amount of heroin Rivera possessed was more consistent
with distribution rather than personal use). See Rice & Delker, supra note 9, at 714.
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tent with 'intent to distribute.' "67 This expansion may or may not
impact future decisions of the other circuits, but it does present a red flag
for all federal prosecutors who are trying drug-related cases similar to
that of Defendant X. Therefore, the language used in both the question
posed to the expert and the answer given is determinative of whether or
not the evidence is permissible under Rule 704(b), but it is not disposi-
tive of the outcome of the case.68
THE MIRRORING HYPOTHETICAL
The mirroring hypothetical is one effective tool that is often used in
eliciting helpful prosecution testimony from expert witnesses. This
method of questioning appears, on its face, to be a neutral forum through
which the expert may impart her opinion based on her expertise. Fact
patterns, that just happen to be modeled after the same fact pattern the
jury is being asked to analyze, are posed to the expert for her analysis.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has ruled that
mirroring hypothetical are impermissible and constitute reversible error
because these hypotheticals come too close to providing the jury with
the ultimate inference of intent.69 This circuit was the first circuit to
proscribe mirroring hypotheticals.70 It provided a two-part test for deter-
mining whether an expert's testimony violates Rule 704(b). 71 First, the
court should look at "the language used by the questioner and/or the
expert, including use of the actual word 'intent."' 72 Second, the court
examines whether the context of the expert's testimony makes it clear to
the jury that the expert's opinion is based on knowledge of general crim-
inal practices, not "some special knowledge of the defendant's mental
processes. 73
The most recent summation of the the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia policy is found in United States v. Watson.
7
1 If
some questions come close to the line of questioning that the court has
found objectionable, there is no violation of Rule 704(b) so long as the
questions ask and elicit general responses.75 Questioning that produces
67. See In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Boyd, 55
F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
68. There has only been one case, United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
in which a Rule 704(b) error alone was found to constitute reversible error.
69. Boyd, 55 F.3d at 669.
70. Id.




74. 171 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
75. Id. at 703.
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responses suggesting some special knowledge of the defendant's mental
processes is proscribed. Examples of this include expert testimony that
the hypothetical person's conduct "met the elements" of the charged
offense, that the hypothetical individual's possession was "consistent
with intent to distribute," and that the hypothetical person's intent "was
intent to distribute."76 The prosecutor in Watson asked the expert about
drug trafficking generally in the District of Columbia.77 He also asked
"how many 'dosage units' would be contained in 100 grams of cocaine
base," to which the witness responded "700," and concluded that "[m]y
experience easily tells me that if any one individual possesses what's
equivalent to 700 bags of crack cocaine [sic] is in the business of mak-
ing money selling drugs in the streets of Washington, D.C. or
whatever.
78
The Fifth Circuit has held that while an expert may testify about
whether the defendant exhibited certain characteristics, he may not tes-
tify that a hypothetical person committing the same acts as the defendant
would or would not be meeting the element of the crime charged. 79 For
example, the government may introduce evidence that the defendant
exhibited individual behaviors that would indicate to an expert that the
defendant was involved in drug trafficking. The government, however,
could not then introduce evidence by way of a hypothetical to create an
inferential link for the jury to follow.8"
The Seventh Circuit has taken a somewhat more lenient approach
to this type of expert testimony.8' In a case in which the only issue was
whether the defendant had the intent to distribute crack cocaine found in
his possession, the expert was permitted to offer his opinion as to what
the circumstances of the case indicated to him.82 The expert responded
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
79. United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 1999).
80. Id.
81. United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 586 (7th Cir. 1999).
The defense contends that Agent Lanning invaded the province of the jury when he
responded to "hypotheticals" that mirrored the actual actions of Romero. He
responded that in his expert opinion the actions described such as cultivating a long-
term relationship with a juvenile and traveling hundreds of miles to meet that
juvenile tend to indicate an offender who is going to "act out" or go beyond mere
fantasy. According to the defense, this testimony is tantamount to Lanning opining
that Romero had the intent to molest Erich when he transported him in interstate
commerce.
Id. The court concluded that "[w]hile his redirect testimony addressed some of Romero's actions
served up in the form of hypotheticals, he never directly opined as to Romero's mental state when
he crossed state lines with Erich in tow." Id.
82. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1996).
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over a defense objection, "[t]hat this crack cocaine was intended for dis-
tribution."83 The expert pointed to "the fact that there was no parapher-
nalia, no smoking device found on the individual, and the weapon that
was found."84 On appeal, the court reasoned that the expert had not
crossed the Rule 704(b) line and that, viewed in context, the expert was
"merely suggesting that ...this crack probably would be distributed
rather than used by [the defendant himself].85 The expert was merely
expounding on his earlier testimony that a mere user of crack would
usually carry a pipe and would rarely carry such a large supply of crack
at one time, whereas dealers usually carry weapons to protect their sup-
ply.8 6 Thus, the expert's testimony analyzed the facts in a manner that
supported an inference that the defendant had the intent to distribute
without expressly stating the inference himself.
8 7
When courts permit the use of mirroring hypotheticals, it is made
clear to the jury, through a limiting instruction by the court, that the
expert is not qualified to testify on the ultimate issue of intent.88 An
argument exists against the use of all hypotheticals that are not accom-
panied by limiting instructions or explanations of the expert's qualifica-
tions. Hypotheticals lacking limiting instructions, in essence, allow the
testimony to approach a de facto instruction to the jury, based on the
expert witness's opinion, of the defendant's guilt as established through
potentially arbitrary and collateral facts. This would thereby deny the
defendant any real ability to counter the evidence.89
THE CORRECTIVE LIMITING INSTRUCTION
One key to avoiding the inherent pitfalls of expert opinion testi-
mony is for the court to remind the jury that it remains the trier of fact
for all of the ultimate issues, regardless of the opinions offered for its
83. Id. at 650.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 653.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. See also Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1991). Testimony about other drug
transactions, through hypothetical scenarios, is also condemned based upon the rule of "res inter
alios acta" which:
forbids the introduction against an accused of evidence of collateral facts which by
their nature are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to
the principle matter in dispute, the reason being that such evidence would be to
oppress the party affected, by compelling him to be prepared to rebut facts of which
he would have no notice under the logical relevancy rule of evidence, as well as
prejudicing the accused by drawing away the minds of the jurors from the point in
issue.
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consideration. 9° It is therefore advisable for the district court to admon-
ish the jury:
The fact that an expert has given an opinion does not mean that it is
binding upon you or that you are obligated to accept the expert's
opinion as to the facts. You should assess the weight to be given to
the expert opinion in the light of all of the evidence in this case. 91
Furthermore, any potential prejudice or undue weight that resulting from
the expert opinion testimony may be avoided by reminding the jury that
"typical behavior and methods of narcotics traffickers [does] not pre-
clude a finding that similar behavior by a defendant might nevertheless
be consistent with innocent pursuits."9
THE BACK DOOR ENTRYWAY: GETrING INTENT IN
Despite limitations, there are ways for the government to get testi-
mony regarding a defendant's intent admitted. First, the prosecutor must
establish the witness's expertise based on her experience as a law
enforcement officer with an extensive background in the relevant area.
Both the prosecutor and the expert witness should make it explicitly
clear that the expert's opinion stems from her experience and not from
any specific knowledge of the facts of the specific defendant's case or
his mental state. Second, the prosecutor should not use the arresting or
investigating officer to testify as an expert. This will keep the factual
and expert witnesses separated in the jurors' minds. Third, the prosecu-
tor cannot merely avoid the use of mirroring hypotheticals. 93 The gov-
ernment must be certain that the expert's testimony offered for the jury's
consideration is helpful without creating the possibility of confusion in
the jurors' minds. The court is rightfully wary whenever a law enforce-
ment officer testifies, in her expert opinion, regarding typical behavior
or common tools of the trade for drug-related offenses when the testi-
mony bears a resemblance to the charged conduct.94 Fourth, verbal cir-
90. See Stephen S. Saltzburg, Opinions on Intent: Mirroring Facts of the Case, 13 CRIM.
JUST. 21, 24 (Fall 1998). Saltzburg observes:
In any case in which the trial judge is uncertain as to how to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible opinion, the judge may be well advised to instruct
the jury ... that the expert witness has no knowledge of the facts of the case being
tried and cannot offer any opinion regarding the intent or mental state of a particular
defendant.
Id.
91. United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261, 1275 (7th Cir. 1995).
92. United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403, 1411 (2d Cir. 1991).
93. See Saltzburg, supra note 90, at 24.
94. United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 664 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing convictions for
conspiracy to possess cocaine for distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine;
holding expert testimony cannot be used solely to "bolster the credibility of the government's fact-
witnesses by mirroring their version of events").
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cumlocutions such as "the drugs were for distribution [purposes]" are
generally not advisable because of the heightened potential for these
statements to be deemed error since any potential for reversal must be
avoided. There is a distinct possibility that the courts, following the lead
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, will come to view
such statements as equivocal to stating an impermissible inference
regarding the defendant's intent.
What follows in this Comment are proposed questions and answers
that would constitute permissible expert opinion testimony by law
enforcement officers in a simple drug-related prosecution, given this
author's analysis of the restrictions imposed by Rule 704(b). These
scripts allow a prosecutor to elicit all of the expert opinion testimony
needed in order to enable the jury to make the necessary inference of the
defendant's intent without being violative of Rule 704(b), regardless of
the circuit the trial is in. In all of the circuits, it is essential for the
prosecutor to remind the jury that the questions asked are based upon the
witness's expertise in the field of narcotics investigations and not on any
special knowledge of the defendant's mental state. The following set of
hypothetical questions and answers are modeled after the case of United
States v. Hubbard and the answers are based on standard cocaine distri-
bution practices from 1991. 95
Q: Do you have any personal knowledge of the facts of this case?
A: No.
Q: As an expert in the area of narcotics distribution in this district!
city/county, do you have an opinion as to what a typical distribution
quantity of cocaine is in this district/city/county?
A: Yes.
Q: In your opinion, what is that amount?
96
A: At the wholesale level, cocaine is typically distributed in quan-
95. Hubbard, 61 F.3d at 1274. Frank Tucci, a DEA agent with over twenty-one years of
experience, was permitted in this trial to testify as an expert concerning organized cocaine
distribution. Although Tucci played no role in the investigation of this particular case against
Hubbard, his testimony touched on a number of the key elements in the government's case against
Hubbard. The statistics used in these model answers are based on Tucci's testimony in Hubbard.
96. The courts allow testimony regarding typical user quantities because it aids the jury by
putting the drug dealer in context with the drug world. United States v. Hunter, 95 F.3d 14, 17
(8th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Wilson, 964 F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 1992). This
reasoning is based on the assertion that it is a reasonable assumption that a jury is not well versed
in the behavior and average consumption of drug users. United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738,
741 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Testimony about the weight, purity, dosages, and prices of cocaine clearly
relates to knowledge beyond the ken of the average juror."); United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55,
60 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Although [expert's] testimony could be used by the jury to conclude that the
amount of heroin found in Taylor's apartment was probably for distribution purposes . . .
testimony was helpful because the amount of heroin for personal use is hopefully not something
within the ken of an average juror.").
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tities of one kilogram with a purity of approximately eighty-five percent
or greater.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to how much one kilogram of
cocaine was worth in this district/city/county in May, 1991?
A: Yes.
Q: How much was one kilogram of cocaine worth in May, 1991?
A: In May, 1991, the wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine with
a purity of eighty-eight percent would have been between $19,000 and
$26,000.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to how cocaine is typically sold at
the wholesale level in this district/city/county?
A: Yes.
Q: How is cocaine typically sold at the wholesale level?
A: Narcotics are typically sold at the wholesale level either for
cash at the time of sale or on consignment, with the expectation that the
buyer will promptly re-sell the cocaine and pay the wholesaler from the
proceeds.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what the most common form of
payment for cocaine is in this district/city/county?
A: Yes.
Q: What is that form of payment?
A: Cash is the most common form of payment for narcotics
because it is difficult to trace.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what size bills are most com-
monly used in the payment for cocaine in this district/city/county?
A: Yes.
Q: What size bills are most commonly used to pay for cocaine in
this district/city/county?
A: It depends on what type of cocaine is involved. For instance,
crack cocaine is usually sold in dosage units, so smaller bills such as
wads of tens and twenties are associated with the sale of crack cocaine.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to how many "dosage units" would
be contained in one hundred grams of cocaine base?
A: Yes.
Q: How many "dosage units" would be contained in one hundred
grams of cocaine base?
A: From one hundred grams of cocaine base someone could create
the equivalent of approximately 700 bags of crack cocaine.97
If the case at trial involved code words, appropriate testimony
97. See United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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would be as follows: 98
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not narcotics dealers
speak in code when discussing their transactions in this district/city/
county?
A: Yes.
Q: Is it typical for narcotics dealers to speak in code when discuss-
ing their transactions?
A: Yes.
In a case where the defendant was found with a weapon, a prosecu-
tor might ask:
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not narcotics distribu-
tors in this district/city/country typically carry firearms?
A: Yes.
Q: Tell us, do narcotics distributors typically carry firearms?
A: Yes. Narcotics distributors typically carry firearms (sometimes
more than one) for protection.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not narcotics distribu-
tors in this district/city/county typically attempt to maintain a low profile
in the community?
A: Yes.
Q: Do narcotics distributors typically attempt to maintain a low
profile in the community?
A: Yes, so as to avoid the attention of authorities.
For a prosecution involving drugs and paraphernalia found in a
legal/warranted home search, testimony might look like:
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether there are certain "tools of
the trade" in this district/city/county that would be necessary for cocaine
trafficking?
A: Yes.
Q: What "tools of the trade" would be necessary for a cocaine dis-
tributor to have?
A: A typical cocaine distributor would have inositol to cut the
purity of the cocaine base and scales to weigh the drugs. Generally,
cocaine is packaged for distribution in corner-cut ziplock baggies.99
98. Because the primary purpose of coded drug language is to conceal the meaning of the
conversation from outsiders through deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers' jargon is a specialized
body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for expert testimony. See United States v.
Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 591
(3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 1996).
It is well established that experienced government agents may testify to the meaning of the jargon
of the narcotics trade and drug dealers' code language.
99. See United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1260 (7th Cir. 1996).
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For a prosecution involving drugs and paraphernalia seized during
or after an on-the-street buy:
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what a narcotics trafficker in this
district/city/county would have with him when purchasing drugs from
another dealer?
A: Yes.
Q: What would a narcotics trafficker have with him when he is
purchasing drugs?
A: For any amount over [fill in statutorily defined personal use
amount], the trafficker would want to carry a scale with him to measure
the weight of the drugs.1 °°
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what a narcotics trafficker in this
district/city/county would have with him when selling drugs on the
street?
A: Yes.
Q: What would a narcotics trafficker tend to have with him when
selling drugs on the street?
A: He would typically have large amounts of cash in small denom-
inations, he would be carrying a pager, and probably would use a "stash
house."10 l
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what a narcotics trafficker in this
district/city/county would probably not have with him when selling
drugs on the street?
A: Yes.
Q: What wouldn't a narcotics trafficker be likely to have with him
when selling drugs on the street?
A: It is unusual for narcotics traffickers to carry implementations
for using the drugs, such as crack pipes or syringes, when they are sell-
ing the drugs on the street.
For a prosecution involving drugs, such as marijuana, and para-
phernalia seized during an unrelated legal car stop:
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether drug dealers in this dis-
trict/city/county transport narcotics within their automobiles?
A: Yes.
Q: Do they?
A: Yes. Dealers often transport narcotics in hidden compartments
within their automobiles so as to avoid police detection in the event of a
stop.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether there are typical roles in
100. See United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1994).
101. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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this district/city/county that the different individuals in the automobile
fill?
A: Yes.
Q: In your opinion, what are those roles?
A: Typically, the operator of an automobile, where guns and drugs
are present is the "supplier" of the drugs, while the passenger sitting on
the weapon is the "enforcer."' 102
Q: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not a drug dealer in
this district/city/county will invite others to participate in this type of
transaction who are not aware of the nature of the transaction?
A: Yes.
Q: Is it normal for a drug dealer to invite others to participate in
this type of transaction who are not aware of the nature of the
transaction?
A: No. In my experience I have never come across a "blind mule"
or an unwitting courier.' 3
Q: Do you have an opinion as to the shelf life of marijuana?
A: Yes.
Q: How long can marijuana stay fresh in large quantities?
A: In order to use one-half to three-quarters of a pound of mari-
juana before it turns stale by losing its THC content, a person would
have to smoke approximately thirty to thirty-five joints per day."°
All of these examples stay within the purview of the expert's
knowledge without crossing the threshold into the defendant's intent
either directly or indirectly. Therefore, as necessitated by Rule 704(b)
this line of questioning leaves the ultimate inference of the defendant's
intent to the jury.
CONCLUSION: THE UTILITY OF THE ULTIMATE ISSUE RULE
The Practical Application Of Rule 704(B)
"[T]he ultimate issue rule that was abolished in Rule 704(a) has
been partially restored in Rule 704(b)" without an explanation of how
this amendment improves the judicial process. 105 Furthermore, it is not
102. See United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
103. See United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1992).
104. See United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 705 (7th Cir. 1999).
105. Rice & Delker, supra note 9, at 711. Rice and Delker further stated that:
It is important to remember that the jury will be hearing competing experts and does
not have to accept the diagnosis of either, or either's application of the law to their
diagnosis. Any limitation on this testimony after the jury has already heard the
entire factual predicate simply hides probative information from the jury-a
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entirely clear to the courts precisely to whom and how far the limitations
of Rule 704(b) extend. 10 6 Experts make desirable witnesses because a
jury wants to hear what they think about the same facts that the jury is
weighing. Without the benefit of the proscribed testimony, the jury may
not be able to make a fully informed decision.0 7 Logically, the expert's
opinion is the ultimate purpose of her testimony before the jury. Con-
versely, under Rule 704(b), an expert's opinion about what the defen-
dant did or did not know and/or intended at the time of the crime is not
evidence that a jury may consider: "The purpose of Rule 704(b) is to
have jurors decide [the issue] without being told what conclusion an
expert might draw."'0 8
As the Seventh Circuit has noted:
[Rule 704(b)] denies juries the specialized knowledge of experts
in just the type of complex case in which it is most useful. This runs
counter to the role of experts in trials, criminal and civil, to which we
have become accustomed, both at common law and under the Federal
Rules. 1o
Statistically, Rule 704(b) does not create much of a problem by way of
overturned convictions; however, realistically and logistically, it sets up
an obstacle course for government prosecutions of drug-related
crimes.l"O Prosecutors must take into account the concerns voiced by
conclusion the jury probably has already anticipated-without justification or
benefit.
Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
106. See Barry Tarlow, Creative Expert Testimony on Predicate Matters and Rule 704(b), 21
CHAMPION 41, 41 (June 1997) ("A majority of the federal courts hold that Rule 704(b) only
excludes testimony as to defendant's actual mental state during the charged offense or testimony
which necessarily would imply that ultimate conclusion.").
107. See, e.g., United States v. Reno, 992 F.2d 739, 743-44 (7th Cir. 1993). The court
observed that:
To assist the jury in determining whether Reno was acting consistently with a
delusion or whether the delusions from which he suffered did not affect his behavior
on the day of the robbery, Dr. Thrasher described what a person acting consistently
with a delusion might do ... Because Dr. Thrasher's testimony was merely of the
type that would help the jury understand Reno's illness, the jury was free to
consider that testimony along with evidence of Reno's behavior in reaching its
conclusion about Reno's defense of insanity. Dr. Thrasher's testimony was helpful
and in no way invaded the jury's province.
Id.
108. United States v. West, 962 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1992).
109. United States v. Brown, 32 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1994).
110. "The fact finder is simply left hanging if the expert is not permitted to cap off the
testimony by stating a conclusion on the ultimate issue to which the expert is testifying.
Sometimes, a conclusion on an ultimate issue ties the expert's testimony into a coherent whole,
and as such it helps the jury to understand the issues in dispute." Daniel J. Capra, Advisory
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence that May Require Clarification, 182 F.R.D.
268, 281 (1998). Compare to the practical effect of Rule 704(b) to New York arson cases of
People v. Maxwell, 497 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1986). In Maxwell, testimony of two expert witnesses,
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various circuits regarding the newly revived proscription on ultimate
issue testimony. By repeatedly referring to the expert's opinion based
on his experience, without getting into the specifics of the defendant's
case, the prosecutors is clearly offering the expert's testimony to assist
the fact-finder in determining the ultimate issue of the defendant's
intent. Additionally, the posture of these questions should specifically
avoid setting up the explicit dichotomy between personal use and distri-
bution; thus, focusing only on aspects of distribution in order to steer
clear of the use of the phrase "consistent with." This evasion of the
dichotomy removes the danger of surreptitiously treading into 704(b)
territory because this line of inquiry circumvents any testimony that
would require the expert to draw inferences.
THE PURPOSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE ULTIMATE ISSUE
"If the expert witness is permitted to state his opinion on all of the
questions of fact that the jury will have to answer in order to arrive at its
ultimate conclusion" on the defendant's knowing possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute, why must the expert be barred
from stating the legal conclusion that is impelled by his answers to the
questions of fact?' Forcing the court to impose an artificial barrier
between what constitutes the expert's factual opinion and what may be
construed as the expert's legal opinion, requires a very fine distinction
that belies the tension between Rule 704(a) and (b). 1I2 It just does not
make sense to force the government to jump through the hoops set up by
Rule 704(b), when the jury is charged with weighing all of the evidence
and basing its decision on the cumulative effect of the adversarial trial
process. Part of this adversarial process is cross-examination, which
ought to serve as enough of a protection for the defendant against the
potential prejudice of undue weight granted to expert opinion testimony.
UP IN THE AIR: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
While Rule 704(b) has not been truly detrimental to garnering or
preserving convictions for possession with the intent to distribute con-
trolled substances, its legislative history should give us pause. The
stating that fires involved were not chemically, mechanically, electrically, or naturally caused and,
thus, eliminating all non-suspect causes, did not constitute testimony that fires in question were
incendiary in nature and, thus, was admissible since such testimony did not actually state a
conclusion as to ultimate issue as to whether fires were intentionally set. Maxwell, 497 N.Y.S.2d
at 736.
111. Olicker, supra note 13, at 863.
112. See Braswell, supra note 43, at 621; see generally Kathy Jo Cook, An Opinion: Federal
Judges Misconstrue Rule 704 (Or is that an Impermissible "Legal" Conclusion?), 43 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 45 (1995).
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application of the rule to drug-related prosecutions is clearly outside the
contemplation of the Insanity Defense Reform Act and the crime control
bill under which it was enacted. The ensuing case law reflects the prob-
lem of drafting uniform legislation without the benefit and counsel of an
advisory committee. The committee may be better equipped to predict
potential theoretical conflicts between and among the various eviden-
tiary rules, such as the conflicts that exist between Rule 704(a) and
704(b), and will take into account the practical aspects of following the
literal rule of law. Unless and until the United States Congress clarifies
that it meant for Rule 704(b) to apply exclusively to mental health
experts, prosecutors must remain vigilantly aware of the differences in
the decisions of the various circuit courts as they fine tune their interpre-
tations of this exception. Prosecutors must adjust their predicate ques-
tions to the specifications of each individual circuit. As it stands now,
the exception is a narrow one: Prosecutors are still permitted to build
their cases step-by-step; they simply cannot cross the threshold of infer-
ence to the ultimate issue.
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